Source: LA Times
Walk softly and carry a message of mutual respect. That was the Obama administration's initial approach to China, part of a broad policy of seeking dialogue on difficult issues with friends and enemies alike. In that spirit, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton visited the People's Republic on her first trip abroad and avoided public expressions of concern about Chinese human rights abuses. President Obama put off meeting China's nemesis, the Tibetan Dalai Lama, ahead of his own foray to China, hoping to focus attention on core U.S. concerns such as nuclear proliferation in Iran and North Korea, trade relations and climate change. He held his tongue when his hosts carefully stage-managed the trip to eliminate all opportunities for dissent, and the two sides issued such a cooperative communique that political analysts began to speculate about a "G-2" era in which the powers would address global problems together.
That was last year. By January, the murmurs of a sea change in Sino-American relations already were being drowned out by the noise of bilateral friction over a series of issues. First, Clinton publicly supported Google's threat to pull out of China because of Internet censorship, and warned of a new "information curtain" on the order of the Cold War's iron curtain; the Chinese government snapped back that this was a business dispute, not the business of the two governments. Making matters worse, Obama approved a $6.4-billion arms sale to the self-governing island of Taiwan, which China claims as its own; Beijing retaliated by cutting off U.S.-Chinese military cooperation and, for the first time, threatening to punish U.S. companies involved in the sale.
Then, Clinton publicly advised China that it risks diplomatic isolation and disruption to its energy supplies unless it helps keep Iran from developing nuclear weapons; China very publicly responded that if Obama met with the Dalai Lama as expected this month, it would cause "serious damage" to the bilateral relationship. And last week, despite having slapped tariffs on Chinese tire imports, Obama promised Democrats "constant pressure" on China to open its markets to U.S. goods and to let its currency appreciate. A senior Chinese official responded Thursday that China would not succumb to pressure to revalue its currency.
What happened? Has China grown arrogant, as some argue, or just cranky? Has the U.S. lost patience, or lost its way? The answer is none of the above.
These clashes should come as no surprise. The United States and China are prone to misunderstandings, and serious, long-standing disagreements between the two countries over issues such as Taiwan and Tibet were never going to be resolved overnight -- nor will they be resolved in the near future. Some China watchers suggest that Obama was naive to adopt a conciliatory approach toward the communist government and that his lack of success argues for a combative posture. We don't think so. The United States frequently alternates between carrots and sticks in its foreign policy, and neither works all that well by itself. The relationship with our biggest competitor -- and, not incidentally, biggest debt collector -- is a long-term endeavor that requires maturity and nuance on both sides. Mutual respect may not succeed at first, but posturing and public scolding are almost always ineffective.
The Taiwan arms deal is just one example of the disconnect in interests and perceptions. To the United States, the sale of defensive weapons represents the continuation of a 40-year policy of support for Taiwan that should come as no surprise to China. Obama declined to approve the F-16 fighter jets that the Taiwanese have long sought, but to have canceled the deal as China wanted would have exposed him to charges of failing to live up to defense obligations from those who already portrayed him as soft on China.
For Obama, the timing of the announcement made sense: after his trip to Beijing and ahead of a hoped-for visit to Washington by Chinese President Hu Jintao this year. Beijing, however, saw it as particularly untimely given that relations between Beijing and Taipei are on the mend. To the Chinese, the arms deal meant continued U.S. meddling in an issue of sovereignty, a setback after Obama committed during his visit to focusing on shared interests. The Chinese place the sale in a broader context with other U.S. moves -- such as the redeployment of U.S. troops to Afghanistan and the Asia-Pacific, or closer ties between India and the U.S. -- and they discern in it all a U.S. strategy of containing the rise of China. In that sense, Clinton's Internet comments may look to the Chinese as though she's declaring a cold war rather than, say, seeking negotiations for cyber security, which could be in the interests of both countries.
U.S. presidents routinely meet with the Dalai Lama to show support for Tibetan human rights, but to the Chinese, Tibet is another domestic issue; the religious leader argues for autonomy, and they fear independence. Either way, they don't think the United States should be involved. The administration thought it had addressed China's concerns by delaying the meeting, while China sees an affront in the fact that the two men are meeting at all.
Beyond sovereignty, economic development is China's core interest, and that's the context in which Beijing views Iran, a main supplier of the oil it consumes. Beijing does not think that Iran poses a threat, but a cutoff of the oil does. Clinton clumsily tried to make the case that sanctions against Iran were in China's self-interest, but it came off as more of a threat when she said that China would find itself isolated if it didn't go along with the United States, Europe and Russia, and that its energy supplies would be threatened by turmoil in the Persian Gulf should Israel launch a military attack against Iran.
So what's to be done? Neither country wants to derail a relationship that has been improving gradually but steadily for the last 30 years. China depends on our markets for growth, and we depend on it for financial stability. Therefore, the two sides need to return to building mutual respect and a strategic trust, despite the undeniable political divide over the proper role of government; of course, we must do so while holding true to core values such as respect for human rights. China needs to grow into its position as a global player and possible partner with the United States. Meanwhile, Obama must refrain from pandering to Democratic protectionism in an election year. The United States and its allies need to make an effective case that it is in China's self-interest to support sanctions on Iran, revalue its currency and open its borders to more goods.
That was last year. By January, the murmurs of a sea change in Sino-American relations already were being drowned out by the noise of bilateral friction over a series of issues. First, Clinton publicly supported Google's threat to pull out of China because of Internet censorship, and warned of a new "information curtain" on the order of the Cold War's iron curtain; the Chinese government snapped back that this was a business dispute, not the business of the two governments. Making matters worse, Obama approved a $6.4-billion arms sale to the self-governing island of Taiwan, which China claims as its own; Beijing retaliated by cutting off U.S.-Chinese military cooperation and, for the first time, threatening to punish U.S. companies involved in the sale.
Then, Clinton publicly advised China that it risks diplomatic isolation and disruption to its energy supplies unless it helps keep Iran from developing nuclear weapons; China very publicly responded that if Obama met with the Dalai Lama as expected this month, it would cause "serious damage" to the bilateral relationship. And last week, despite having slapped tariffs on Chinese tire imports, Obama promised Democrats "constant pressure" on China to open its markets to U.S. goods and to let its currency appreciate. A senior Chinese official responded Thursday that China would not succumb to pressure to revalue its currency.
What happened? Has China grown arrogant, as some argue, or just cranky? Has the U.S. lost patience, or lost its way? The answer is none of the above.
These clashes should come as no surprise. The United States and China are prone to misunderstandings, and serious, long-standing disagreements between the two countries over issues such as Taiwan and Tibet were never going to be resolved overnight -- nor will they be resolved in the near future. Some China watchers suggest that Obama was naive to adopt a conciliatory approach toward the communist government and that his lack of success argues for a combative posture. We don't think so. The United States frequently alternates between carrots and sticks in its foreign policy, and neither works all that well by itself. The relationship with our biggest competitor -- and, not incidentally, biggest debt collector -- is a long-term endeavor that requires maturity and nuance on both sides. Mutual respect may not succeed at first, but posturing and public scolding are almost always ineffective.
The Taiwan arms deal is just one example of the disconnect in interests and perceptions. To the United States, the sale of defensive weapons represents the continuation of a 40-year policy of support for Taiwan that should come as no surprise to China. Obama declined to approve the F-16 fighter jets that the Taiwanese have long sought, but to have canceled the deal as China wanted would have exposed him to charges of failing to live up to defense obligations from those who already portrayed him as soft on China.
For Obama, the timing of the announcement made sense: after his trip to Beijing and ahead of a hoped-for visit to Washington by Chinese President Hu Jintao this year. Beijing, however, saw it as particularly untimely given that relations between Beijing and Taipei are on the mend. To the Chinese, the arms deal meant continued U.S. meddling in an issue of sovereignty, a setback after Obama committed during his visit to focusing on shared interests. The Chinese place the sale in a broader context with other U.S. moves -- such as the redeployment of U.S. troops to Afghanistan and the Asia-Pacific, or closer ties between India and the U.S. -- and they discern in it all a U.S. strategy of containing the rise of China. In that sense, Clinton's Internet comments may look to the Chinese as though she's declaring a cold war rather than, say, seeking negotiations for cyber security, which could be in the interests of both countries.
U.S. presidents routinely meet with the Dalai Lama to show support for Tibetan human rights, but to the Chinese, Tibet is another domestic issue; the religious leader argues for autonomy, and they fear independence. Either way, they don't think the United States should be involved. The administration thought it had addressed China's concerns by delaying the meeting, while China sees an affront in the fact that the two men are meeting at all.
Beyond sovereignty, economic development is China's core interest, and that's the context in which Beijing views Iran, a main supplier of the oil it consumes. Beijing does not think that Iran poses a threat, but a cutoff of the oil does. Clinton clumsily tried to make the case that sanctions against Iran were in China's self-interest, but it came off as more of a threat when she said that China would find itself isolated if it didn't go along with the United States, Europe and Russia, and that its energy supplies would be threatened by turmoil in the Persian Gulf should Israel launch a military attack against Iran.
So what's to be done? Neither country wants to derail a relationship that has been improving gradually but steadily for the last 30 years. China depends on our markets for growth, and we depend on it for financial stability. Therefore, the two sides need to return to building mutual respect and a strategic trust, despite the undeniable political divide over the proper role of government; of course, we must do so while holding true to core values such as respect for human rights. China needs to grow into its position as a global player and possible partner with the United States. Meanwhile, Obama must refrain from pandering to Democratic protectionism in an election year. The United States and its allies need to make an effective case that it is in China's self-interest to support sanctions on Iran, revalue its currency and open its borders to more goods.
Copyright © 2010, The Los Angeles Times
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